外国投资法草稿：VIE企业挑战和机遇并存

　　VIE 结构作为中国资本市场上的一种特殊安排，为中国企业突破政策限制、实现资本国际化发挥了重大作用。公众耳熟能详的互联网企业背后，几乎都有 VIE 结构的身影。这个专业性很强的概念本来并不为大多数人所知，但因为在阿里上市等重大资本项目中被屡屡提及，近年来也变得广为人知——但鲜为人知的是，VIE 结构是竞天公诚在服务中国联通香港上市项目时最早原创。今年初，商务部发布《中华人民共和国外国投资法（草案征求意见稿》，对 VIE 结构的企业将有重大影响。应《商法》杂志约稿，竞天公诚律师事务所合伙人黄永庆律师撰文对外国投资法草案对 VIE 结构企业的影响做了解读，以下中英全文转载。

　　外国投资法草稿：VIE企业挑战和机遇并存

　　自商务部于年初公布《中华人民共和国外国投资法（草案征求意见稿）》（《外国投资法草稿》）以来，VIE模式（即外资协议控制境内企业的模式）的法律效力问题再次引发了讨论。《外国投资法草稿》明确了《外国投资法》将适用于VIE模式下外资控制境内企业的情形。这一变化为使用VIE模式的企业即带来了挑战也提供了机遇。

　　《外国投资法草稿》为国内VIE企业提供的一个机遇是，它为解决长期受到质疑的VIE模式的合规性缺陷（即规避外商投资限制）提供了一条制度路径。这主要体现在如下几个方面：

　　实际控制人

　　首先，《外国投资法草稿》开创性地引入了“实际控制人”标准判定投资者的中外身份。也就是说，中国投资者控制的外国企业在中国的投资可能会被认定为中国投资者的投资。这意味着，过去的“假外资”将能够正式地回归为“真内资”，从而不必再受中国对外商投资的监管。

　　这个重大监管理念的转变将使得那些实际控制权由中国籍自然人持有的VIE企业通过《外国投资法草稿》未来所设定的程序，正式确认其VIE结构的合规性成为可能。VIE模式主要是中国企业为了便利其境外融资而采用的结构，而该等境外融资一般不会导致境外投资人获得实际控制权。

　　因此，我们可以合理推测《外国投资法草稿》将使得为数众多甚至是绝大多数的VIE企业解决其VIE结构合规性薄弱的问题，甚至不排除某些实际控制人为外籍人士的VIE企业可能因此会考虑将实际控制人变更为中国籍人士。

　　负面清单

　　第二，《外国投资法草稿》设置了对限制类和禁止类外商投资领域的负面清单机制。中共中央十八届三中全会决议中提及“推进金融、教育、文化、医疗等服务业领域有序开放，放开育幼养老、建筑设计、会计审计、商贸物流、电子商务等服务业领域外资准入限制”。

　　可以预计，未来出台的负面清单的范围将反映进一步对外资开放市场特别是开放服务业的大趋势。如果某个行业领域不被负面清单限制或禁止，则VIE模式自然不再具有合法性缺陷，甚至也不具有存在的必要性。这也将使众多的VIE企业能从监管放松中获得便利。

　　融资便利

　　第三，《外国投资法草稿》对现有的外商投资逐案批准体制进行了根本的重构，而建立在旧体制上的六部委《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》（即10号令）也理应面临全面的调整甚至废除。例如，10号令中的“关联并购”的规定就难以符合《外国投资法草稿》设定的“国民待遇+负面清单”原则，因此至少应予取消。这将非常有利于中国企业更灵活地搭建境外融资结构，减少交易成本。某些为解决“关联并购”问题而不得不采用VIE结构的个案也因此不会存在。

　　总之，《外国投资法草稿》所代表的中国外商投资监管模式变革为包括VIE企业在内的众多中国民营企业实施境外融资提供了更大的机遇和便利。即使VIE模式不再被采用，但搭建传统的红筹模式也将变得更加便利，并对企业更具吸引力。《外国投资法草稿》预示着那些真正的外国企业采用的VIE结构（数量不多）将会面临更严格的监管，但这种监管也应该严格限定在未来负面清单所列的产业领域内。

　　VIE何时消失？

　　不过，即使在《外国投资法草稿》获通过生效之后，VIE模式在一定时间内也不太可能完全消失，特别是在某些外资限制类的、发展迅速而获得外资准入较难的领域。这一定程度上是因为VIE模式对监管者的监管能力和监管手段均构成具有挑战性的任务。

　　VIE模式也许最终会消失，但很可能以几个重要条件的满足为前提。一是，建立于上世纪70年代末的现行外商投资管理模式将完全淡出，外资进入限制性政策和审批制度完全由外资进入安全审查机制以及反垄断监管所取代。这将避免重复监管，减少行政成本和交易成本。二是，中国的资本市场进一步开放和市场化，企业可以无行政限制地进行跨境融资、上市行为。

　　Draft foreign investment law presents opportunities and challenges to VIE companies

　　Since the Ministry of Commerce issued the draft Foreign Investment Law for comments earlier this year, discussions have reignited over the validity of the variable interest entity (VIE) model, in which foreign investors control domestic enterprises by agreement. The draft law has provided that the law will apply to the control of domestic enterprises by foreign investors under the VIE model, which will both opportunities and challenges to companies adopting that model.

　　One of the opportunities is that the draft law provides an institutional path for addressing the long-debated compliance issue of the VIE model – i.e. the argument that VIEs are used to circumvent foreign investment restrictions. This is manifested primarily in the aspects discussed below.

　　Actual controllers

　　The draft law has introduced the groundbreaking criteria of “actual controllers” for determining whether investors are domestic or foreign. In other words, an investment made in mainland China by foreign enterprises controlled by Chinese investors may be recognized as investment by Chinese investors. This means that false “foreign” investment will be formally recognized as the domestic investment it is, and will no longer be subject to regulations on foreign investment.

　　This major shift will make it possible for the VIE structures of companies effectively controlled by natural persons who are Chinese nationals to be formally ascertained as compliant by the procedures to be set by the draft law.

　　After all, the VIE model is mainly adopted by Chinese companies to facilitate overseas financing, which generally will not enable overseas investors to acquire actual control.

　　It can be reasonably presumed that the draft law will allow many or even the majority of VIE companies to resolve the weak compliance issues of their VIE structures. It is even possible that certain companies that are effectively controlled by foreign nationals may consider making Chinese citizens their actual controllers.

　　Negative lists

　　The draft law adopts a negative list mechanism for areas in which foreign investment is restricted and prohibited. This is in line with the decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, which sets out that they would “promote the orderly opening up of finance, education, culture, healthcare and other service sectors, lift limits on access for foreign investment in childcare, care for the elderly, architectural design, accounting and auditing, trade and logistics, electronic commerce and other such service sectors”.

　　The negative lists have yet to be published, but they are expected to reflect the general trend of creating greater market access to foreign investors, especially in the service sector. If a certain sector is not listed as restricted or prohibited on the negative list, a VIE structure will no longer have any defects in terms of legality, and may even be unnecessary. The deregulation will benefit a large number of VIE companies.

　　Facilitating financing

　　The draft law has fundamentally restructured the existing system of case-by-case approval for foreign investment. As a result, the Regulations on the Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, which were jointly drafted by six ministries and commissions based on the old regulatory regime, will need to be fully revised or perhaps even abolished. Its provisions on affiliated mergers and acquisitions, for example, are unable to meet the law’s principles combining “national treatment”, where foreign investors are treated the same as domestic investors, with the negative investment list, and thus should at least be repealed. This will greatly benefit domestic enterprises, as they will be able to set up more flexible overseas financing structures and lower their transaction costs. There will no longer be isolated cases where a VIE structure is required for resolving affiliated merger and acquisition issues.

　　In short, the reform of the foreign investment regulatory regime as represented by the draft law will bring greater opportunities and conveniences for private Chinese enterprises, VIEs included, to raise funds overseas. Even should the VIE structure no longer be used, structuring via a traditional red chip model will also become more convenient and attractive to businesses. The draft law signals that (a small number of) VIE structures adopted by actual foreign enterprises will face more stringent regulation, but that regulation would be strictly limited within the sectors on the negative list.

　　Will the VIE vanish?

　　Even after the draft law is passed and takes effect, the VIE model is unlikely to disappear altogether in the near future, particularly in burgeoning sectors with restricted foreign investment in which market entry approval is difficult to obtain. This is partly because the VIE model presents challenges to regulators in both regulatory capabilities and means.

　　Several important conditions would have to be satisfied for the VIE model to vanish. First, the existing management regime for foreign investment that was established in the late 1970s would need to be completely abolished. The restrictive policies and the market entry examination and approval system for foreign investors would also need to be replaced by a security review mechanism and antimonopoly regulation. This would serve to avoid duplicated regulation as well as lower administrative and transaction costs.

　　Second, the domestic capital market would need to be further liberalized and become more market-oriented. This would enable enterprises to engage in cross-border financing and seek public listing without administrative restrictions.